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Isolation in Penal Settings: The Isolation-Restraint 
Paradigm 
Fred Cohen* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On any given day, of the two-plus million people in American 
jails and prisons, a significant percentage are serving time in some 
sort of isolation1—in facilities or units variously termed supermaxes, 
control units, special management units (SMUs), security (or special) 
housing units (SHUs), high-security units, intensive management 
units (IMUs), and special control units (SCUs).2 A developed 
literature describes these isolation units and facilities at length, and 
establishes the psychological damage they impose on their 
inhabitants. They are, to quote corrections expert Chase Riveland, 
“sterile, austere, arbitrary, and . . . [generally without] correctional 
objective.”3 There are those inmates who need to be placed under 
 
 * Professor Emeritus, State University of New York at Albany, School of Criminal 
Justice; Co-editor, Correctional Law Reporter; Executive Editor, Correctional Mental Health 
Report and Juvenile Correctional Mental Health Report; Author, The Mentally Disordered 
Inmate and the Law (1999 & Supp. 2003). The author also has served as a court-appointed 
monitor or expert in six different jurisdictions and, thus, has extensive experience inspecting 
and monitoring prisons. He is currently the independent consultant in the case of Fussell v. 
Wilkinson, No. C-1-03-704 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 13, 2003), and is monitoring medical care in all of 
Ohio’s prisons. Thanks are extended to Professor Jim Robertson, Professor Margo Schlanger, 
and corrections experts Steve Martin and Bill Collins for their helpful comments. 
 1. The Bureau of Justice Statistics does not have data on the number of inmates in 
solitary confinement. Letter from Jennifer Karberg, Statistician, Bureau of Justice Statistics, to 
Fred Cohen (Sept. 22, 2005) (on file with author). 
 2. See Craig Haney, Mental Health Issues in Long-Term Solitary and “Supermax” 
Confinement, 49 CRIME & DELINQ. 124, 151 (2003). The supermax prison, of course, is not an 
internal unit but an entire facility devoted to an extraordinary degree of sensory and social 
isolation. Id. at 124–25. Some jurisdictions have used the term “isolation” informally, as a 
subset of segregation and particularly to indicate the use of a solid (or boxcar) front door.  
 3. Report of Plaintiffs Expert, Chase Riveland at 14, Osterback v. Moore, No. 97-2806-
CIV-HUCK (S.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 2003) (describing isolation units in Florida’s prisons). 
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stringent control to protect staff and other inmates, prevent escapes, 
and preserve the order of the facility, but the number of such inmates 
is very small—far smaller than the number in isolation.  
Riveland advocates such isolation units be used only for inmates 
presenting an imminent threat and only for as long as the threat 
exists.4 His proposal for change is to reduce the number of inmates in 
penal isolation and at least to pause before plunging ahead with 
expensive and problematic supermax facilities.5 While my comments 
and proposals for change are based on similar views of the problem, I 
take a somewhat more sweeping approach to its solution, proposing a 
true paradigm shift. Isolation, I suggest, should be analyzed 
constitutionally, much as physical restraints are now. As I describe in 
detail below, recent Supreme Court case law and longstanding lower 
court precedent has insisted that prisons and jails limit their use of 
physical restraints to situations in which those restraints are necessary 
for contemporaneous control and security—not as deterrent or 
punishment.  
This Article asserts that isolation and the use of mechanical 
restraints should be treated as almost identical interventions in terms 
of rationale, duration, monitoring, and creation of law and policy.6 
Isolation units are not a fixed, invariable condition of penal 
confinement. Penal isolation is variable in its extremes of 
deprivation. At its most extreme, it should simply be banned; in its 
less onerous forms, isolation should be sharply limited, closely 
monitored, and very closely regulated.7 This reform may well require 
abandonment of supermax confinement as well as the even more 
restrictive, primitive “dark cell.” 
 
 4. Id. at 11. 
 5. Id.  
 6. See, e.g., JACK ZUSMAN, RESTRAINT AND SECLUSION: IMPROVING PRACTICE AND 
CONQUERING THE JCAHO STANDARDS (1997) (discussing the use of a common practice when 
dealing with hospital settings or juveniles in custody by treating restraint and seclusion as cut 
from the same cloth). Dr. Zusman does present some dubious distinctions, suggesting negative 
effects of seclusion may be less damaging than restraints. Id. at 37. Of course, he would not 
likely have been thinking of long-term penal isolation. 
 7. See ANDREW COYLE, INT’L CTR. FOR PRISON STUDIES, A HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACH 
TO PRISON MANAGEMENT: HANDBOOK FOR PRISON STAFF 80–81 (2002) (describing various 
forms of solitary confinement). 
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II. DEGREES OF ISOLATION 
A. What is Isolation? 
The most extreme form of isolation, at times referred to as “dark 
cells,” consists of inmates held in solitary confinement and subject to 
social isolation and near total “sensory deprivation by lack of access 
to light, sound[,] or fresh air.”8 
There was a time when such conditions were, if not routine, at 
least common.9 This is no longer the case, but such “first degree 
isolation” remains in scattered instances.10 What I will call “second 
degree isolation,” similarly having roots in the early history of 
American corrections,11 is far more common. This form of isolation 
(often called “segregation”) has inmates housed typically in single 
cells for twenty-three hours a day with limited access to outside light 
and air, yet able to hear some movements outside their cell, and even 
yell or “tap” (in code) as communication. Meals are taken alone in 
the cell, exercise is indoors and highly restricted, and access to 
programs, visits, telephone, radio, television, showers, and reading 
material is substantially limited. This is characteristic of the isolation 
or segregation units noted above and the typical supermax units. 
“Second degree” isolation or solitary confinement thus conveys a 
set of circumstances beyond life in a single, quiet cell. It 
definitionally includes deprivation of many of life’s most basic 
components that link one to social intercourse, the rudimentary sights 
and sounds of life, and basic decision-making in life’s most mundane 
choices. As one moves from such isolation to the still deprived world 
of ordinary prison conditions, we pass an uncertain line that divides 
isolation from the mere harsh conditions of penal confinement. The 
critical factors in this divide would be out-of-cell time, congregate 
 
 8. Id. at 80. 
 9. See SCOTT CHRISTIANSON, WITH LIBERTY FOR SOME: 500 YEARS OF IMPRISONMENT 
IN AMERICA 133–38 (1998) (describing conditions and practices at Pennsylvania’s Eastern 
Penitentiary). 
 10. I personally observed such conditions in the Alabama prison system during a tour 
given when I was an expert witness. 
 11. CHRISTIANSON, supra note 9, at 134–35 (describing New York State’s Auburn prison 
and the Philadelphia system as relying on silence, separation, discipline, regimentation, and 
industry). 
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activity, exercise or “yard time,” and access to work and available 
programs. Put another way, the greater the social isolation and 
sensory deprivation, the more eligible the unit is to be labeled as 
penal isolation. 
B. How Custody Levels Can or Cannot Be Classified as “Isolation”? 
For the approach I propose to be adopted it would be necessary to 
decide which of the many types of custodial arrangements and 
settings counts as “isolation.” This is a complex question, but not an 
impossible one. Except in the case of the true supermax facility, the 
penal isolation that is the subject of this Article is distinguishable 
from the security level assigned a particular prison. Prisons are 
generally classified as maximum, close, medium, minimum, or a 
camp (although there is no assurance that prisons in different 
jurisdictions use these security terms in precisely the same fashion12). 
In general, however, security levels of prisons will turn on such 
factors as perimeter barriers, detection devices, mobile patrol, gun 
towers, internal architectural features, housing, and staff-inmate 
ratios.13 Within any given prison (certainly the maximum, close, and 
medium prisons) an inmate will likely be assigned a custody level 
that addresses such items as out-of-cell time, need for escorts, visits, 
searches, and other similar issues.14 In general, except in supermaxes, 
ordinary confinement of even maximum security inmates allows 
them some access to congregate dining, outdoor exercise, and out-of-
cell programming, and therefore does not approach the level of social 
and sensory deprivation necessary for inclusion in the category of 
“isolation.”  
There are, however, a variety of non-ordinary confinement 
settings which are indeed isolationary. The segregation units within a 
particular facility to which an inmate may be assigned as discipline or 
for administrative reasons (“disciplinary segregation” and 
 
 12. See Robert B. Levinson & Roy E. Gerard, Classifying Institutions, 32 CRIME & 
DELINQ. 291, 294 (1986). 
 13. Id. at 295–96. 
 14. See Michael B. Cooksey, Custody and Security, in PRISON AND JAIL 
ADMINISTRATION: PRACTICE AND THEORY, at ch. 10 (Peter M. Carlson & Judith Simon Garrett 
eds., 1999). 
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“administrative segregation” units) are typically characterized by the 
kind of extreme deprivation with which I am concerned. (In addition, 
protective custody units present a variety of issues, some of which are 
pertinent here—like the degree of permissible “consensual” 
isolation—and many that would take us too far astray.15 
Prison administrative codes, some prison officials, and the courts 
(to a certain extent) attempt to draw a bright line between disciplinary 
and administrative segregation and isolation. For example, in New 
York, placement in a SHU will be categorized as administrative 
segregation if the facility has determined that the “inmates’ presence 
in general population would pose a threat to the safety and security of 
the facility.”16 Administrative segregation may be imposed for 
extraordinarily long terms and generally without a pre-deprivation, 
due process-type of hearing.17 
Administrative segregation terms generally are indefinite, 
although some administrative review process may be required.18 On 
the other hand, while disciplinary segregation terms tend to be 
 
 15. See Ron Angelone, Protective Custody Inmates, in PRISON AND JAIL 
ADMINISTRATION: PRACTICE AND THEORY, at ch. 31 (Peter M. Carlson & Judith Simon Garrett 
eds., 1999). As improbable as it may seem, California prisons are “converting entire yards into 
protective custody” areas termed sensitive-needs yards (SNY). See Sam Quinones, Easing the 
Hard Time, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2005, at A1. There are some 13,000 inmates, about 9% of the 
total adult male inmate population, renouncing gang memberships and asking for a sensitive-
needs placement. Id. Protective custody issues not pertinent to this discussion include the legal 
duty to protect inmates and the problem of inmates faking to gain entry into the isolation unites. 
 16. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 7, § 301.4(b) (2002). 
 17. Jones v. Baker, 155 F.3d 810, 816 (6th Cir. 1998) (finding that two and one-half 
years, id. at 812, in such segregation during an investigation into the inmate’s role in a prison 
riot did not create a protected liberty interest implicating the need for a hearing). In Shoats v. 
Horn, 213 F.3d 140 (3d Cir. 2000), the court upheld eight years of administrative segregation 
where the inmate was celled for twenty-three hours a day for five days out of the week and for 
twenty-four hours during the remaining two days per week. Id. at 144. The inmate ate alone, 
could not participate in any programs and activities, was allowed no family visits, and was 
prohibited from visiting the library. Id.; see Eight Years of Solitary Confinement Upheld, 
CORRECTIONAL MENTAL HEALTH REP., Mar.–Apr. 2001, at 92, 92 (describing the opinion as 
“muddled”). 
 18. See AM. CORR. ASS’N, STANDARDS FOR ADULT CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS § 4-
4249 cmts. (4th ed. 2003) (allowing administrative segregation to be for “relatively extensive 
periods of time”). Curiously, the standard states: “Total isolation as punishment for a rule 
violation is not an acceptable practice . . . .” Id. There is no similar injunction against “total 
isolation” while in administrative segregation. Id. 
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definite and, according to one corrections expert, in the fifteen- to 
thirty-day range,19 these distinctions are often more formal than real. 
Corrections officials may move “short-term” disciplinary 
segregation inmates to administrative segregation by the simple 
process of reclassification if for some reason the disciplinary term is 
deemed too brief.20 As for conditions of confinement, disciplinary 
and administrative isolation are very similar in prisons across the 
nation.21 
Thus, I recognize that while the general term “penal isolation” 
may mask some distinctions between disciplinary and administrative 
segregation (or isolation) it serves my purposes here to use the 
generic term. The harm of extended isolation does not correlate with 
intent to punish versus intent to preserve security. Further, the harm 
caused by extended isolation under the most straightened or barbaric 
conditions is not related to any rationale for the isolation. The 
virtually unregulated and unreviewable opportunities for crossovers 
between disciplinary and administrative segregation provides strong 
support for recognizing the conceptual differences while focusing 
reform efforts on pragmatic grounds.22 
In Part VI of this Article I make allowances for short terms of 
disciplinary confinement, albeit under humane conditions. It is the 
extended terms of penal isolation, whether labeled disciplinary 
segregation or, more likely, administrative segregation, that engages 
me and leads to the proposal that isolation and mechanical restraints 
should be recognized as having a shared heritage and common basis 
for use. 
 
 19. Telephone interview with Steve Martin, Attorney/Consultant, in Austin, Tex. (Sept. 
30, 2005). 
 20. Telephone interview with William C. Collins, Attorney, in Olympia, Wash. (Sept. 30, 
2005). 
 21. See Michael Z. Goldman, Sandin v. Conner and Intraprison Confinement: Ten Years 
of Confusion and Harm in Prisoner Litigation, 45 B.C. L. REV. 423, 461 (2004). Even the 
amenities or privileges of disciplinary and administrative isolation tend to be similar. Id. 
 22. See MICHAEL JACKSON, JUSTICE BEHIND THE WALLS: HUMAN RIGHTS IN CANADIAN 
PRISONS 287 (2002) (“The very term ‘administrative segregation’ provides apparently benign 
semantic camouflage for the most intensive form of imprisonment.”). 
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III. HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
Before I discuss some of the legal issues involved and then 
develop the isolation-mechanical restraint paradigm, a brief word on 
historical context. In Scott Christianson’s brilliant book With Liberty 
for Some: 500 Years of Imprisonment in America, the author 
describes Pennsylvania’s Eastern Penitentiary, opened in 1829 and 
intended to keep convicts apart—even as they worked.23 Eastern is 
eerily similar to the modern supermax or the “SHUs” in use today, 
except inmates could work (weave, make shoes) in their cells and 
there was, however misguided, a reformative ideal upon which the 
practice was predicated.24 The imposing sixteen-foot-high cells were 
part of a regimen of “silence, separation, discipline, regimentation, 
and industry [designed] to achieve positive human change.”25 Penal 
isolation today offers no pretense of reformation and provides no 
vocational options, although I am aware that some isolation facilities 
or units use a level system that allows for enhanced amenities—for 
example television sets and radios and additional out of cell time—
thus somewhat reducing the sensory and social isolation. 
Alexis de Tocqueville, Gustave de Beaumont, and the aspiring 
novelist Charles Dickens were among Eastern’s early visitors.26 
Tocqueville and Beaumont were impressed.27 Dickens, in contrast, 
found: 
[T]his slow and daily tampering with the mysteries of the 
brain, to be immeasurably worse than any torture of the body, 
and because its ghastly signs and tokens are not so palpable to 
the eye and sense of touch as scars upon the flesh; because its 
wounds are not upon the surface, and it exhorts few cries that 
human ears can hear; therefore I the more denounce it, as a 
 
 23. CHRISTIANSON, supra note 9, at 132–38. 
 24. Id. at 134–35. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 135–37. Tocqueville and Beaumont visited Eastern in October of 1831 while 
Dickens visited the institution in March of 1842. Id. 
 27. Id. at 135. 
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secret punishment which slumbering humanity is not roused up 
to stay.28 
In the nineteenth century theories of crime causation led 
inexorably to theories and practices of crime control.29 The 
temptations and confusion of the outer world were believed to have 
led the godless and morally weak to succumb to the temptations. The 
well-ordered and isolated confines of the penitentiary, along with 
required work, would lead to penance, reform, and the acquisition of 
work ethic. Or, it just might lead to self-mutilation, suicide, or a 
lifetime of despair. 
Indeed, when the ideas of isolation and silence as penance and the 
prison as monastery ultimately succumbed, what followed was a 
pernicious system of leasing inmates typified by the Elmira, New 
York reformatory system, which quickly deteriorated into a brutal, 
overcrowded, school-for-crime phenomenon.30 Zebulon Brockway, 
Elmira’s first superintendent, came to view his prisoners as 
degenerates, and the whippings and other physical assaults he 
authorized were pursued as reformative, not punishment.31 Reform 
rarely has been kind to the inmates. 
Curiously, today’s binge with multi-million dollar supermaxes 
and the increasing reliance on extended isolation in various special 
management units rests on no theory of criminal or even serious rule-
violation behavior. It is a management decision that is purely 
reactive, rarely reformative, reviewed, or rethought.32 Chase Riveland 
 
 28. Id. at 138 (quoting CHARLES DICKENS, AMERICAN NOTES FOR GENERAL 
CIRCULATION 148 (N.Y. 1972) (1842)). Dickens, not Tocqueville, got it right. See Bernard-
Henri Lévy, In The Footsteps of Tocqueville (Part V), ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Nov. 2005, at 
110–12 (describing Tocqueville’s error of observation concerning Eastern Penitentiary by 
emphasizing the power given to the guards to see the inmates without being seen as a power 
that could cause inmates a deeper terror than chains and blows). 
 29. See, e.g., DAVID J. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND 
ITS ALTERNATIVES IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA (1980) [hereinafter ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE]; 
DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER IN THE 
NEW REPUBLIC (2d ed. 1990) [hereinafter ROTHMAN, DISCOVERY]. Rothman demonstrates 
how the prevailing experts located the causes of crime and mental illness in the community. 
Both the well-ordered and isolating prison and the “insane asylum” were born from a desire to 
cure these causes of crime and mental illness. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE, supra at 117–18, 123.  
 30. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE, supra note 29, at 33–36. 
 31. Id. at 36. 
 32. Haney, supra note 2, at 126 (writing that supermax confinement is part of a long-term 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol22/iss1/23
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points out that the proliferation of supermax housing is based partly 
on the symbolism of showing how tough a jurisdiction is with the 
motivating force emanating more often from governors and 
legislators than corrections officials.33 Governors are caricatured as 
leaning back in their office chairs and petulantly mumbling, “Hey, 
they have a supermax right next door, why don’t we have one!?” 
Contracting and construction would soon follow. 
Getting tough, of course, was much easier when the federal and 
state governments were running surpluses. With record deficits and 
calls for fiscal austerity, one now hears rallying cries for “smart” 
corrections. Smart corrections, in turn, appear to include rethinking 
the supermax prison—perhaps the most expensive-to-run facility in 
any jurisdiction—however not necessarily getting “soft” with regard 
to the isolation units within less-than-supermax facilities.34 “Smart” 
corrections, then, is much more about saving money than saving 
souls. Diversion, sentencing reform, and discharge planning as 
“smart” corrections have no lofty ideological foundation within the 
smart corrections crowd. Reform is driven by fiscal considerations 
with perhaps some post-hoc remedial rationalizations. 
Returning more closely to the historical context there is, of course, 
a long history of other failures in the use of harsh measures of 
imprisonment in the 181 years since Eastern opened its doors. While 
the line from these early experiments to our current excessive use of 
penal isolation is not unbroken; the heritage is clear, even if the 
genetic structure is a bit diluted. 
 
management and control strategy and not an “immediate sanction for discrete rule infractions”).  
 33. CHASE RIVELAND, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NAT’L INST. OF CORR., SUPERMAX 
PRISONS: OVERVIEW AND GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 5 (1999). Thus, any charismatic wardens 
or theoretically inclined academic reformers are off the hook for our experiments with extended 
isolation. 
 34. See Wiley Hall, States Rethinking the Purpose of Prisons, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 7, 
2003, http://www.cjcj.org/press/prison_purpose.html. States were expected to experience 
combined deficits of $78.4 billion in 2004. Id. “Steve Crawford, a corrections expert with the 
National Governors Association” uses the ‘get smart’ approach to crime” as a way to critique 
supermax prisons and support diversion and rehabilitation efforts. Id. 
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IV. WHAT IS WRONG WITH PENAL ISOLATION? 
There are two distinct ways to analyze and assess the negative 
consequences associated with penal isolation. First, there is the 
human rights approach, an approach that has support in the Eighth 
Amendment’s proscription of cruel and unusual punishment. For 
example, Justice Stevens observed in Overton v. Bazzetta, “[i]t 
remains true that the ‘restraints and the punishment which a criminal 
conviction entails do not place the citizen beyond the ethical tradition 
that accords respect to the dignity and intrinsic worth of every 
individual.’”35  
The original concern of the drafters of the Constitution may have 
been limited to the proscription of torture and other barbarous forms 
of physical punishment. More recent Supreme Court decisions, 
however, rely on evolving standards of decency associated with a 
maturing society which encompasses broad and idealistic concepts of 
dignity and civilized standards of humanity and dignity.36 Thus, these 
dignitarian values form a protective shield around even those 
convicted of a crime and when violated do not require empirical 
evidence of harm. Extended penal isolation is violative of the most 
basic of dignitarian and humanistic values and comfortably fits 
within the Supreme Court’s current human rights approach under 
Eighth Amendment standards. 
Second, there is the empirical approach which focuses on the 
needless harm caused inmates by extreme social and sensory 
deprivation. An entire literature exists documenting that harm. For 
example, Jennifer Wynn’s study of lockdown facilities in New York 
 
 35. 539 U.S. 126, 138 (2003) (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting United States ex rel. 
Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701, 712 (7th Cir. 1973)). Incidentally, Justices Thomas and 
Scalia, concurring, restate their view that a prisoner’s punishment is the sentence imposed, and 
prison officials are delegated the power to discipline a subject only regarding whether they act 
within the boundaries of the rather limitless discretion contained in the judicial sentence. Id. at 
140 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 36. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), which is the seminal decision 
constitutionally requiring that state prisoners receive adequate medical care for their serious 
ailments. Id. at 104–05; see also RENÉ PROVOST, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
HUMANITARIAN LAW 7–10 (2002) (discussing human rights and humanitarian law). Whether 
viewed as an enforceable claim or a required standard of conduct, prolonged penal isolation is 
an aspect of human rights. PROVOST, supra at 33. 
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found some five thousand state inmates in twenty-three-hour 
disciplinary lockdown.37 New York has eleven high-tech lockdown 
facilities and units.38 Wynn found that some 23% of these inmates are 
on the mental health caseload.39 Within these prisons suicide rates are 
high, fecal misuse and self-mutilation are common,40 and there are no 
meaningful programs, jobs, or group activities—only isolation and 
despair.41 Jamie Fellner, writing for Human Rights Watch, found 
much the same destructiveness in her study of the use of lockdown in 
Indiana’s prisons.42 Her work also emphasized the particularly acute 
destructive potential of such settings for the mentally ill. 
In summary, Professor Craig Haney writes, 
[T]here is not a single published study of solitary or supermax-
like confinement in which nonvoluntary confinement lasting 
for longer than 10 days, where participants were unable to 
terminate their isolation at will, that failed to result in negative 
psychological effects. The damaging effects ranged in severity 
and included such clinically significant symptoms as 
hypertension, uncontrollable anger, hallucinations, emotional 
breakdowns, chronic depression, and suicidal thoughts and 
behavior. Of course, it is important to emphasize that not all 
supermax prisons are created equal, and not all of them have 
the same capacity to produce the same number and degree of 
negative psychological effects.43 
 
 37. Jennifer R. Wynn & Alisa Szatrowski, Hidden Prisons: Twenty-Three-Hour 
Lockdown Units in New York State Correctional Facilities, 24 PACE L. REV. 497, 502 (2004). 
See HANS TOCH & KENNETH ADAMS, ACTING OUT: MALADAPTIVE BEHAVIOR IN 
CONFINEMENT 23 (2002) (finding about 8% of New York’s prisoners segregated or locked 
down for disciplinary reasons). 
 38. Wynn & Szatrowski, supra note 37, at 502. 
 39. Id. at 510. 
 40. Id. at 511, 518. 
 41. Id. at 522. 
 42. See JAMIE FELLNER, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, COLD STORAGE: SUPER-MAXIMUM 
SECURITY CONFINEMENT IN INDIANA (1997), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1997/ 
usind/. 
 43. Haney, supra note 2, at 132. Professor Haney refers to some forty-six studies 
supportive of his views on harm. Id. at 130–32; see also, e.g., Stuart Grassian, Psychiatric 
Effects of Solitary Confinement, 22 WASH. U. J.L. POL’Y 325 (2006). 
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The studies referred to describe loss of appetite, sleep 
disturbances, anxiety, panic, rage, loss of control, hallucinations, self-
mutilation, suicide ideation, hopelessness, fecal misuse, and more. In 
addition, studies support a high degree of prevalence rates on these 
destructive factors.44 
Admittedly, a case might be made that for a select few prisoners 
even rather prolonged penal isolation is a desired experience.45 The 
modern dungeon does provide relative safety and predictability. I 
have had some inmates tell me that going into “seg,” at least for a 
relatively brief, determinate time, is a welcome time-out. For inmates 
who cannot pay their debts or resist sexual predation it may be a 
welcome form of de facto protective custody. 
These persons are the extraordinary exceptions, and while there 
must be protocols in place to deal with them, the outliers cannot serve 
as the basis for a general rule. Only if an advocate of prolonged 
isolation can show that psychological destruction is negligible and 
human values are basically maintained is my call for basic reform 
impaired. I do not believe that such a showing can be made. 
V. LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
A. The Use of Mechanical Restraints 
Mechanical restraints include any means of restricting an inmate’s 
or detainee’s ability to react physically. They usually involve the use 
of such devices as leather straps, cuffs, braces, and, most recently, a 
specially designed chair to which the person is strapped.46 
 
 44. See Haney, supra note 2, at 132–37. 
 45. See, e.g., TOCH & ADAMS, supra note 37, at 414–15 (describing Scottish prisoner 
Jimmy Boyle, arguably the most violent prisoner in Scotland, asking for solitary confinement as 
a way to find peace of mind; he later became an established sculptor and writer).  
 46. More particularly, the reference is to a device designed to interfere with the free 
movement of one’s arms and legs or which totally immobilizes the person (for example, the 
four-point restraint) and which device must be modified or discontinued by a third person. 
 Analytically, one may approach the use of mechanical restraints in three different 
circumstances: (1) point-to-point movement within a facility; (2) movement outside the 
perimeter of a facility, typically to another destination (such as to the hospital, court, prison); 
and (3) immobilization within the facility. 
 Various forms of mechanical restraints—cuffs and leg irons are the most common—are 
used when transporting certain inmates, during visits, or when simply moving about the facility. 
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The American Correctional Association rules out mechanical 
restraints for punishment, requires warden (or designee) approval for 
use, early medical involvement and monitoring, and other 
precautionary measures when restraints are utilized.47 The use of 
restraints is to be purely preventive (for example, to prevent escape, 
self-harm, or injury to others) and applied for no more time than is 
absolutely necessary.48 Many systems require that a cell extraction 
leading to restraint, as well as the actual application, be videotaped. 
Such videos (and I have seen hundreds) are invaluable monitoring 
and training resources.  
Correctional law mirrors correctional practice in this area. In 2002 
the Supreme Court issued its first ruling on the use of mechanical 
restraints in corrections. The Court held, in Hope v. Pelzer, that 
Alabama’s use of a “hitching post” was clearly unconstitutional.49 
The opinion is awash with concern for dignitarian values. Hope was 
punished for refusal to work and made to remove his shirt; he was 
attached to a cross-bar type post, which held his arms above shoulder 
height and then was forced to remain standing in the sun with no 
bathroom breaks and little water.50 
 
This type of restraint when limited to the type of specified activity just described is not within 
the scope of this Article. See Cameron v. Tomes, 990 F.2d 14 (1st Cir. 1993) (interestingly 
discussing the transport issue). 
 47. See AM. CORR. ASS’N, supra note 18, at 4-4190 to -91. The American Bar 
Association’s standards for prisoners does not address isolation or segregation. Currently, the 
ABA has convened a task force to address the legal status of prisoners, co-chaired by Alvin J. 
Bronstein and Margaret C. Love, is revising and expanding the twenty-year-old existing 
standards. I expect isolation and supermax prisons to be touched upon. I am serving as a 
member of the task force. 
 48. AM. CORR. ASS’N, supra note 18, at 4-4190 to -91. 
 49. 536 U.S. 730, 737 (2002). See SASHA ABRAMSKY & JAMIE FELLNER, HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED: U.S. PRISONS AND OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL ILLNESS, at ch. XI 
(Joseph Saunders & James Ross eds., 2003) (relaying my belief that Alabama is the worst 
system for prison mental health, according to what I have seen in observing floridly mentally ill 
inmates locked in metal shipping container-like cells, with an uncovered, dangling light bulb 
the only light available to the hapless inmates. This surely is the point where isolation crossed 
the border into torture, at least as broadly defined). 
 Under international law, torture is defined as any act by which severe pain or suffering, 
physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person, other than the pain or suffering 
inherent in penal confinement. See COYLE, supra note 7, at 34. The more common domestic 
definition of torture is “[t]he infliction of intense pain . . . to punish, to extract a confession or 
information, or to obtain sadistic pleasure.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1528 (8th ed. 2004). 
 50. Hope, 536 U.S. at 734–35. 
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Although Justice Stevens discussed the dehydration and burned 
skin shackled inmates experienced, this transient harm was not 
central to the decision.51 He wrote for the majority: 
As the facts are alleged by Hope, the Eighth Amendment 
violation is obvious. Any safety concerns had long since 
abated by the time petitioner was handcuffed to the hitching 
post because Hope had already been subdued, handcuffed, 
placed in leg irons, and transported back to the prison. He was 
separated from his work squad and not given the opportunity to 
return to work. Despite the clear lack of an emergency 
situation, the respondents knowingly subjected him to a 
substantial risk of physical harm, to unnecessary pain caused 
by the handcuffs and the restricted position of confinement for 
a 7-hour period, to unnecessary exposure to the heat of the sun, 
to prolonged thirst and taunting, and to a deprivation of 
bathroom breaks that created a risk of particular discomfort 
and humiliation. The use of the hitching post under these 
circumstances violated the “basic concept underlying the 
Eighth Amendment, which is nothing less than the dignity of 
man.” This punitive treatment amounts to gratuitous infliction 
of “wanton and unnecessary” pain that our precedent clearly 
prohibits.52 
Hope accords with longstanding law in the courts of appeal and 
district courts. While mechanical restraints may be employed as an 
aspect of the legitimate use of force to prevent violence or property 
destruction and as a means to temporarily restrain a mentally ill 
inmate who is acting out, they may not be used for punishment 
alone.53 For example, in Spain v. Procunier, in 1979, the Ninth 
 
 51. See id. at 743–44. 
 52. Id. at 738 (footnotes and citations omitted) (quoting Trop v. Dolles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 
(1958)). 
 53. See Ferola v. Moran, 622 F. Supp. 814, 821 (D.R.I. 1985). There is no standard on 
point that would permit restraints as punishment; or, for the mentally ill, for “mere 
convenience” as well. Id. at 824–25 (describing the criteria for the use of restraints). But see 
Murphy v. Walker, 51 F.3d 714, 718 n.6 (7th Cir. 1995) (“Whether using bodily restraints as 
punishment violates the Eighth Amendment is an open question in this circuit.”). Murphy also 
suggests that detainees have greater protection than convicts as to restraints. See id. at 717. 
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Circuit condemned the excessive use of neck chains.54 In Stewart v. 
Rhodes the four-point restraint shackling of an inmate to a metal bed 
frame was condemned.55 When mechanical restraints are judicially 
upheld it is because they are not used for punishment but to prevent 
physical harm to the inmate or others; further, the duration is 
relatively brief (measured in hours), there is monitoring, and meals 
and bathroom breaks are provided.56 
Accordingly, the use of mechanical restraints, even for a relatively 
brief period of time, may result in the award of damages.57 The 
condemnation of such restraint may be based on an excessive use of 
force analysis or a failure to provide a due process hearing for the 
interference with a protected liberty interest. 
Sadler v. Young, a modest federal district court decision, has 
wonderful didactic qualities related to the use of mechanical 
restraints on inmates. Sadler, a Connecticut inmate farmed out to the 
stern Virginia prison system, apparently slapped a food tray from the 
hands of a guard and was subsequently immobilized for about forty-
eight hours in five-point restraints.58 He was dressed in undershorts, 
uncovered, and released without incident six times, for about fifteen 
minutes each time, to use the toilet and eat.59 
In Sadler’s action for damages, the jury found for the defendants 
but, in the instant decision, Chief Judge James P. Jones ruled as a 
 
 54. 600 F.2d 189, 197 (9th Cir. 1979). 
 55. 473 F. Supp. 1185, 1193 (S.D. Ohio 1979) (also recognizing that use of restraints can 
be permissible where injury to self or others is to be prevented and there is monitoring); see 
also Laws v. Cleaver, 140 F. Supp. 2d 145, 151 (D. Conn. 2001) (upholding a four-hour 
restraint following an altercation). 
 56. In Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622 (2005), the Court held that the Due Process Clause 
prohibits the routine use of physical restraints visible to the jury during the punishment phase of 
a capital case. Id. at 633. The majority noted that earlier judicial hostility to shackling may have 
turned on the suffering, even torture, involved, but today’s concerns relate to the perception of 
guilt (or aggravation) and interference with the presentation of the defense or mitigation. Id. at 
630–31. 
 57. See Sadler v. Young, 325 F. Supp. 2d 689 (W.D. Va. 2004) (ordering a jury trial on 
damages where an inmate was undeservedly placed in five-point restraints for almost two full 
days), rev’d and remanded by 118 F. App’x 762 (4th Cir. 2005). See infra notes 59–77 and 
accompanying text. 
 I should note that when the use of a restraint goes bad, the impact on the restrained person 
is swift and often deadly. 
 58. Sadler, 325 F. Supp. 2d at 690. 
 59. Id. 
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matter of law that while the initial restraint could be found 
constitutional, the continued restraint was not.60 A new trial was 
ordered on the issue of damages alone.61 
At the time of the incident, Sadler was in twenty-three-hour-a-day 
lockdown and, thus, received his meals on a tray through a slot in the 
door.62 Sadler did not want his tray on this particular day and so 
informed the officer who brought it to him, Officer S.K. Young.63 
Young continued to slide the tray and when Sadler blocked it or 
shoved it (depending on the testimony), the tray spilled and some of 
the contents got on Young.64 There was a dispute as to the time lapse 
between the tray incident and the eight officers extracting and then 
restraining Sadler.65 It could have been as much as an hour or as brief 
as forty minutes.66 In either case, the argument for a white-hot 
emergency is cooled. 
In any event, Sadler was entirely compliant with the cell removal 
and the application of the five-point restraints.67 This, of course, is 
crucial if the objective of the restraint is to prevent damage or injury, 
or if, as the court finds, it was to impose needless punishment and an 
“atypical and significant” hardship requiring due process.68 
The court initially found a violation of Virginia’s policy on 
restraint, which calls for the removal of restraints when inmates’ 
dangerous or disruptive behavior has subsided and no threat exists.69 
This is relevant to “state of mind” considerations as opposed to 
establishing a federal violation. The defendants could not provide any 
 
 60. Id. at 704. 
 61. Id. at 709. 
 62. Id. at 692. 
 63. Id.  
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 705–07. 
 69. The policy required official approval of restraint beyond forty-eight hours, which 
accounts for the forty-seven-plus hours of actual restraint. Id. at 694. In my experience 
restraints are invariably applied for the maximum time permitted without further approval of a 
ranking official. 
 Warden Young’s response to interrogatories indicated eight incidents of restraint in a four-
month period where inmates did not engage in dangerous behavior during restraint or the 
temporary release. Id. at 695. Verbal abuse is not cause in Virginia to initially place an inmate 
in restraint and should not then be a basis for continuing. Id. at 694–95. 
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satisfactory answers concerning just what the danger was, why they 
decided the supposed danger continued, why other options (of which 
there were five) were not used, or even why Sadler was ultimately 
released.70 
Sadler, on the other hand, showed convincingly that even the 
initial restraint was punitive; that he suffered greatly during the two-
day ordeal, including physical and mental pain, hallucinations, and 
lack of sleep; and that he was required to lie in his own bodily 
waste.71 These, of course, parallel the type of complaints made by 
many in penal isolation. 
Chief Judge Jones treated the constitutional basis of the major 
claim as one of excessive force under the Eighth Amendment.72 This 
required a showing that the force was applied maliciously and 
sadistically to cause harm and that the wrongdoing was objectively 
harmful enough to reach constitutional proportions.73 The court found 
it reasonable that the officers initially believed that Sadler presented a 
danger, that he slapped a tray at the officer versus merely blocking it, 
and that other available options might not work.74 Thus, the judge 
found that there was no showing of initial malice.75 What sort of 
danger Sadler initially posed, locked in his segregation cell with the 
food slot closed, was never described. There exists the possibility that 
Sadler was yelling, but that hardly poses the sort of danger calling for 
almost two full days of five-point restraints. 
This is an important matter in that while the initial, and in my 
view highly dubious, decision to extract and restrain Sadler does not 
necessarily show malice, any reasonable basis loses force as the 
restraint is prolonged. Parenthetically, isolation should be viewed the 
same if it is permissible only as a temporary measure to be utilized so 
long as the concern giving rise to its application continues to exist. 
 
 70. Id. at 695–98. 
 71. Id. at 693, 698–99. 
 72. Id. at 700. 
 73. Id. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992) (involving an individual officer 
punching a shackled inmate); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986) (involving a small scale 
riot). The Supreme Court relies on Whitley and Hudson as the leading precedent on use of force. 
 74. Sadler, 325 F. Supp. 2d at 702. 
 75. Id. 
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In Sadler, the judge confidently found that no reasonable jury 
could have determined that the force applied needed to be continued 
after the first three hours when the inmate supposedly stopped 
yelling.76 This would mean that Sadler was unlawfully restrained for 
some forty-five hours, an obviously relevant point on damages. At 
another point, the judge somewhat undermines this finding by stating 
that it is only necessary to decide that nearly forty-eight hours is too 
long and not whether release should have occurred when the yelling 
stopped or at the uneventful first, second, or third temporary 
release.77 
B. The Current State of the Law on Isolation  
Curiously, while there is pervasive evidence of widespread and 
serious harm from extended isolation, I am aware of little or no 
parallel evidence regarding mechanical restraints except for very 
serious harm, even death, from the improper use of the restraint chair, 
asphyxiation from the “kick-stop restraint,”78 and a series of other 
injuries related to the improper or prolonged use of restraints.79 
 
 76. Id. at 704. 
 77. Id. at 704. The court also determined that individuals have a liberty interest in the 
avoidance of restraint, and that Sadler at some point, although not necessarily at initiation, had a 
right to a due process hearing to discuss the rationale of applying the restraints and the need for 
continuity. Id. 
 78. This means restraining a prisoner with legs and arms tied to a strap behind the 
prisoner’s back. If the person so restrained is then placed face down the risk of asphyxiation is 
high. See Swans v. City of Lansing, 65 F. Supp. 2d 625 (W.D. Mich. 1998) (explaining the 
circumstances giving rise to well-known attorney Geoffrey Feiger’s $12.9 million verdict for a 
death that occurred using the “kick-stop restraint”); see also Campbell v. Sikes, 169 F.3d 1353 
(11th Cir. 1999) (discussing use of straight-jackets and “hog-tying,” euphemistically referred to 
as an “L” shape restraint). 
 79. See Pracy P.Y. Cheung & Bernard M.C. Yam, Patient Autonomy in Physical 
Restraint, 14 J. CLINICAL NURSING 34, 35 (2005) (describing the use of restraints on frail or 
elderly patients and reporting on a variety of physical harms, including nerve damage and 
ischaemic injury; and psychological harms, including anger, fear, denial, demoralization, and 
humiliation); see also Paul S. Applebaum, Seclusion and Restraint: Congress Reacts to Reports 
of Abuse, 50 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 881, 881 (1999) (discussing the Hartford Courant’s study 
of patients’ deaths due to undifferentiated use of seclusion and restraints). From 1988 to 1998 in 
psychiatric wards, group homes, residential facilities for troubled youth, and residential 
facilities for persons with mental retardation, 142 deaths were identified. Id. Sixty-four persons 
died in New York facilities alone from 1988 to 1997, leading the Courant reporters to estimate 
a range of annual deaths at between 50 and 150 for the entire country. Id. The harm endemic to 
extended penal isolation does not result from some error in its application, as is often the case 
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I do not write in support of the hitching post but one should 
contrast the judicial concern expressed for a seven-hour outdoor 
shackling with the absence of concern expressed by the Supreme 
Court about prolonged confinement in penal isolation. In Wilkinson v. 
Austin, the Court dealt with procedural due process issues related to 
confinement in the Ohio State Penitentiary (OSP), a supermax 
facility.80 After Ohio inexplicably conceded the existence of a liberty 
interest in avoiding assignment to OSP, the unanimous Court easily 
found a liberty interest and required a featherweight type of 
procedural due process incident to a transfer to OSP.81 
Any Eighth Amendment claims incident to the Austin litigation 
previously were resolved. However, one can detect a sense of 
substantive acceptance of the deprivations of confinement by the 
Court in some of its discussion: 
For an inmate placed in OSP, almost all human contact is 
prohibited, even to the point that conversation is not permitted 
from cell to cell; the light, though it may be dimmed, is on for 
24 hours; exercise is for 1 hour per day, but only in a small 
indoor room. Save perhaps for the especially severe limitations 
on all human contact, these conditions likely would apply to 
most solitary confinement facilities, but here there are two 
added components. First is the duration. Unlike the 30-day 
placement in Sandin, placement at OSP is indefinite and, after 
an initial 30-day review, is reviewed just annually. Second is 
that placement disqualifies an otherwise eligible inmate for 
parole consideration. While any of these conditions standing 
alone might not be sufficient to create a liberty interest, taken 
together they impose an atypical and significant hardship 
 
where there is harm in penal settings with restraints, but it is inherent in its extended 
application. 
 80. 125 S. Ct. 2384 (2005). 
 81. Id. at 2398. See Fred Cohen, Wilkinson v. Austin: Through a Glass Darkly, XVII 
CORRECTIONAL LAW REP. 17, 27 (2005), where I describe this due process as essentially an 
internal, paper-review process. I also suggested that the Court, while referring to OSP inmates 
as the “worst of the worst,” did not require that a supermax house only such inmates. Indeed, I 
playfully suggested using supermax prisons to house the “best of the best” as a means to protect 
them from the criminogenic affect of more open prisons. 
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within the correctional context. It follows that respondents 
have a liberty interest in avoiding assignment to OSP.82 
Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, goes on to note that 
“OSP’s harsh conditions may well be necessary and appropriate in 
light of the danger that high-risk prisoners pose both to prison 
officials and other prisoners.”83 Thus, the curiously unanimous Court 
in Austin accepts the onerous conditions then extant at OSP as part of 
the Sandin “atypical and significant” analysis.84 However, as I earlier 
noted, there is not a hint of even mild concern about the components 
and consequences of such confinement.85 
Like its concern about restraints, the Supreme Court’s relative 
lack of concern about isolation is typical of the views of federal 
courts more generally. After describing both the popularity and 
destructiveness of current penal isolation, Professor Michael Mushlin 
writes: 
[V]irtually every court which has considered the issue has held 
that the imposition of solitary confinement, without more, does 
not violate the Eighth Amendment. Arguments that isolation 
offends evolving standards of decency, that it constitutes 
psychological torture, and that it is excessive because less 
severe sanctions would be equally efficacious, have routinely 
failed.86 
 
 82. Austin, 125 S. Ct. at 2394–95 (citations omitted). 
 83. Id. at 2395. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. In the text I used the term “then extant” at OSP to reflect my personal knowledge 
of conditions there. I have visited and inspected that facility four times, initially just before the 
inmates were actually housed there and, most recently, in June 2005. The change in that brief 
time period is dramatic: there is now a level system, some inmates are out of their cells jogging 
on the cell block or playing handball against the walls; there is outdoor recreation, and there is 
in-cell and some congregate programming. 
 There were about 300 inmates housed at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility who 
requested transfers from that maximum security facility to the OSP supermax. OSP is now a 
supermax in name only and now houses Ohio’s death row population, guaranteeing them, inter 
alia, at least thirty-five hours a week out-of-cell time. See Austin v. Wilkinson, No. 4:01-CV-
071, 5 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 3, 2005). Whether OSP ever housed the “worst of the worst,” 
exclusively or even importantly, remains a somewhat open question. In my view, it did not and 
will not. 
 86. MICHAEL B. MUSHLIN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS 92–93 (3d ed. 2002) (citations omitted). 
See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1257–58 (9th Cir. 1982) (finding “[t]he deprivation of 
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The exception to courts’ tolerance of isolation is for prisoners 
suffering from serious mental illness. A series of recent decisions 
from California, Texas, and Wisconsin dealing with the isolation, or 
segregation, of such prisoners, resulted in the near total exclusion of 
inmates with serious mental illnesses and those inmates who are in 
some fashion psychologically “at risk” from prolonged isolation.87 
The heightened vulnerability of the mentally ill to the risk of harms 
associated with isolation allows the courts to treat excessive isolation 
either as a treatment failure or, more basically, an unreasonable 
condition of confinement.88 
 
nearly all fresh air and light, particularly when coupled with the guard’s control over the 
window and the electric light, creates an extreme hazard to the physical and mental well-being 
of the prisoner.”); Ruiz v. Johnson, 37 F. Supp. 2d 855, 915 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (finding that 
prison officials violated Eighth Amendment when they subjected inmates to “extreme social 
isolation and reduced environmental stimulation”), rev’d by 178 F.3d 385 (5th Cir. 1999); 
Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1264 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (finding that placement of 
mentally ill inmates in segregation is cruel and unusual punishment), rev’d and remanded by 
150 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Fred Cohen, The Law of Isolation in Brief, 
CORRECTIONAL MENTAL HEALTH REP., July–Aug. 2004, at 17, 28–29 (discussing Freeman v. 
Berge, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1096 (W.D. Wis. 2003)). 
 87. See FRED COHEN, THE MENTALLY DISORDERED INMATE AND THE LAW, at ch. 11 
(1999 & Supp. 2003) (discussing in detail the cases and issues related to isolation and mentally 
ill inmates). In some jurisdictions, policy and procedure forbid housing inmates with serious 
mental illness, or who are psychologically vulnerable, in a supermax facility. See, e.g., OHIO 
BUREAU OF MENTAL HEALTH SERVS., STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE no. 2 (2001): 
OSP Exclusion Criteria: Inmates assessed and diagnosed with the following conditions 
are excluded from transfer to OSP: 
1. Serious mental illness (categorized as C-1 on the Mental Health Level of Care 
Determination, DRC form 5268) 
2. Mental Retardation (categorized as MR/DD on the Mental Health Level of Care 
Determination, DRC form 5268) 
3. Mental disorder that includes: 
a. Being actively suicidal 
b. Severe cognitive disorder (organic mental disorder) that results in significant 
functional impairment 
c. Severe personality disorder that is manifested by frequent episodes of 
psychosis, depression or self- injurious behavior, and results in significant 
functional impairment 
Id.  
 88. Based on their categorical vulnerability, juveniles have prevailed on isolation claims 
where adults would not have. See Lollis v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 322 F. Supp. 473, 
482, 484 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (voiding the two-week confinement of a fourteen-year-old girl in a 
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In addition, current doctrine does provide safeguards against 
protracted use of isolation when it is for therapeutic purposes. Where 
a “safe room” is used for therapeutic isolation and protection, the 
courts have applied rules that are virtually identical to those 
governing therapeutic restraints. 
Nonetheless, Professor Mushlin’s observation about the general 
legal acceptability of even prolonged isolation remains accurate.89 
Except for “safe rooms” and in some jurisdictions, prolonged 
isolation of inmates with serious mental illnesses is often used for 
punishment, without medical or psychological monitoring, and is not 
dependent on a present or continuing threat. Only where penal 
isolation is for punishment or administrative reasons, even for 
extraordinarily long periods of time, is there currently no need for 
protection, rationale, and monitoring requirement. Thus, when the 
prospects of serious harm are the greatest, legal and policy concerns 
are at their lowest. The legal case against prolonged isolation simply 
has not been made on either humane or dignitarian grounds and 
courts have been reluctant to rely on empirical findings as a basis for 
legal condemnation. 
 
stripped room with no recreational outlets or reading and finding the use of shackles on a male 
juvenile in isolation for period of time ranging from forty minutes to two hours was 
impermissible); see also Nelson v. Heyne, 355 F. Supp. 451 (D. Ind. 1972) (discussing a 
possible right to treatment in conjunction with the use of solitary confinement at the Indiana 
Boys School), aff’d 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1994), disapproved by Santana v. Collazo, 714 F.2d 
1172 (1st Cir. 1983). 
 As recently as August 5, 2004, California announced it would abandon near-round-the-
clock confinement (twenty-three hours) of juveniles in 6’ x 8’ cells. California to Halt Extended 
Isolation of Juveniles, JUV. CORRECTIONAL MENTAL HEALTH REP., Nov.–Dec. 2004, at 1, 12. 
 89. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995) (holding that Due Process required a 
prison disciplinary hearing only if the punishment imposed an “atypical and significant” 
hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life). Lengthy terms of 
solitary confinement have been found not to require a hearing. See Colon v. Howard, 215 F.3d 
227, 231 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding that 305 days duration was atypical, but conditions in the SHU 
were not). 
 The important factor is that the “atypical and significant” test, however muddled, is linked 
only with the possible requirement of procedural due process and not the more basic Eighth 
Amendment question of whether isolation per se or for a given time under particular 
circumstances is permitted at all. 
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C. The Doctrinal Avenues for Reform 
The courts’ nonchalance about the pain imposed by isolation has 
not always been so uniform. One precedent to the contrary has 
surfaced recently in some literature.90 In re Medley, a 115-year-old 
Supreme Court decision, involved a state inmate with a death 
sentence who successfully argued that a change in the law after his 
offense, requiring that the warden keep such convicts in solitary 
confinement, was a prohibited ex post facto law.91 The majority 
opinion found that solitary confinement, defined as exclusion from 
human associations, and its terrible psychological impact on 
prisoners was an additional punishment not authorized by law at the 
time of the inmate’s offense.92 The Court was constrained to order the 
release of the prisoner since it had no other remedial options. 
Medley, however, will take us only a little way in our 
contemporary concern about isolation. Why? The use of penal 
isolation was not condemned in general; it was merely found to be 
sufficiently harsh to be an ex post facto (that is, not then authorized) 
punishment. The majority’s reliance on the much older Philadelphia 
system of silence and the mental suffering it caused seems quite 
misplaced where a death sentenced inmate was to be kept in 
mandatory solitary for about four weeks, with guaranteed access by 
various visitors, and with no mention whatsoever of the particular 
conditions of confinement.93 
In sum, with the notable exception of housing inmates with mental 
illness in isolation, the courts have not been receptive to adult inmate, 
isolation-related claims for damages or injunctive relief. The restraint 
cases, however, may serve as a foundation for my argument that 
penal isolation and uses of restraints are far more alike than different, 
and that the same principles should apply.  
 
 90. See, e.g., MUSHLIN, supra note 86, at 90 n.22. 
 91. 134 U.S. 160 (1890) 
 92. Id. at 174. 
 93. Id. at 168–69. I suspect that if the Supreme Court directly faces a condition of 
confinement in isolation claim, Medley will be quickly buried. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p295 Cohen book pages.doc  12/18/2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
318 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 22:295 
 
 
VI. WHAT TO DO 
The text that precedes this part may be seen as a somewhat 
lengthy prologue to what is, after all, a rather brief, straightforward 
call for reform. That is, the use of the “dark cell,” of the most 
extreme forms of social and sensory penal isolation or segregation, 
should be totally banned from our penal facilities as an affront to the 
most basic notions of civilized decency and, therefore, a violation of 
the Eighth Amendment. The type of penal isolation characterized 
here as “second degree” may be permitted, but only according to the 
model of the permissible use of mechanical restraints. As with 
restraints, extended isolation—the purposeful deprivation of serious 
human needs for sensory and social stimulation—should never be 
used for punishment, only for control. As with restraints, two types of 
uses should be anticipated: security related and therapeutic. As with 
restraints, in either situation, use of isolation should be based on an 
immediate need, and only after other, less deprivational alternatives 
have been considered and rejected. The rationale or trigger for any 
isolation determines the permissible duration of the stay with a 
relatively brief (measured in days) limit on consecutive days. Medical 
and security monitoring must be required. Where the inmate appears 
to remain “dangerous” after a specified time, a committee of security 
and program/treatment staff should meet to devise a plan to achieve 
both security and behavioral changes in the inmate. Where the 
isolation imposed is part of an ongoing treatment regimen then, of 
course, the treatment team would be monitoring these events and 
altering the treatment as needed. 
While the reflexive and prolonged use of isolation for an acting-
out prisoner may produce short-term gains, such use likely will 
replicate and reinforce the basis for the offending behavior over 
time.94 Thus, the best practice would be to use limited isolation, only 
in conjunction with an overall treatment or behavior modification 
plan. More generally, however, therapeutic seclusion also may be 
used to contain a clinical situation (agitation or assaultive behavior) 
 
 94. See Jane Coltman, Working at the Coalface, in WORKING WITH DANGEROUS PEOPLE: 
THE PSYCHOTHERAPY OF VIOLENCE 143, 144 (David Jones ed., 2004). 
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by providing a safe environment.95 There is no clean line between a 
clinical situation and one that is not. However, when the inmate is 
known to have a diagnosis of mental illness and is in a treatment unit, 
it is easy to deal with the control problem as part of the treatment 
regimen. In so doing, any complaints about the isolation may be dealt 
with as in Estelle v. Gamble,96 which concerned the deliberate 
indifference to proper mental health care claim. An Estelle claim may 
be a bit easier for an inmate to prevail upon than the Whitley-
McMillian97 “malicious and sadistic” use of force claim.  
To the extent that the use of prolonged penal isolation is reformed 
on the model of the acceptable use of mechanical restraints and as 
part of a treatment or behavior modification program, there is not 
only a paradigm shift but a cultural and linguistic shift. Disruptive 
behavior does not become a violation and a disciplinary event; it is 
“acting out” and dealt with as part of the treatment protocol.  
The niceties of the therapeutic versus security distinction need not 
detain us here since my point is to emphasize that regardless of 
whether isolation is viewed as therapeutic or purely for security, there 
must be an urgency in the application, a limited duration, a concern 
for oversight and medical monitoring. 
The current uses of extended penal isolation are more often than 
not a confession of failure by corrections a reflexive get-rid-of-the-
person rather than an attempt to get-rid-of-the-problem. In so doing 
many inmates are made far worse.98 
 
 95. See COHEN, supra note 87, at 12–16 (referring to the standards issued by the National 
Commission on Correctional Health Care). 
 96. 429 U.S. 97 (1976). 
 97. See supra note 73. 
 98. Hans Toch, who long has labored in this field, writes, “Disturbed-disruptive offenders 
frequently become more disturbed when they are dealt with as disruptive offenders, and are 
liable to become more disruptive when they become more disturbed.” Hans Toch, The 
Disturbed Disruptive, in WORKING WITH DANGEROUS PEOPLE: THE PSYCHOTHERAPY OF 
VIOLENCE 9, 11 (David Jones ed., 2004). 
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A. What to Do When the Inmate Requiring Isolation is a Gang 
Member 
Prison systems regularly seek to identify and then isolate various 
gang members. Membership in a prison gang clearly is not an 
associational right protected by the First Amendment.99 The explicit 
predicate for separating and isolating gang members is a prediction of 
future violence and the need for preventive action. Reducing the 
appeal of gang membership and encouraging a ritual of renunciation 
are often unexpressed goals, implicit in the harshness of the imposed 
penal isolation. 
Recognizing that “gang” is a rather loose term encompassing just 
about any group whose members commit crimes, we can stipulate to 
the existence of gangs in prison and their dangerousness.100 However, 
it does not follow that separation is the only viable control strategy101 
and, more importantly, where separation is used, it also does not 
follow that it must be under the more stringent conditions of penal 
isolation. 
However, the law does not always mandate “best practices” and 
does allow for confinement of gang members in a supermax-type of 
environment.102 Wilkinson v. Austin accepted the stringent conditions 
of confinement said to exist at OSP and required only a nominal form 
 
 99. See Westefer v. Snyder, 422 F.3d 570, 575 (7th Cir. 2005) (emphatically rejecting 
such claim of right when prison officials determine that such membership is detrimental to the 
prison’s legitimate penological goals); see also Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 
U.S. 119 (1977) (rejecting the right to engage in labor union-type activities). 
 In Texas some 7400 inmates were reported to be in long-term lockdown; many due to 
membership in two warring gangs. Mike Ward, Inmates Isolated for Fear of Gangs, AUSTIN 
AM. STATESMAN, Dec. 11, 2005, http://www.statesman.com/metrostate/content/metro/ 
stories/12/11lockdown.html. 
 100. See Mark S. Fleisher & Richard H. Rison, Gang Management in Corrections, in 
PRISON AND JAIL ADMINISTRATION: PRACTICE AND THEORY, at ch. 32 (Peter M. Carlson & 
Judith Simon Garrett eds., 1999). 
 101. Fleisher and Rison argue that a comprehensive program of prison management—
including inmate cooperation, participation in programs, and good staff rapport—is ultimately 
far more productive than removing privileges and extended lockdown. Id. at 235–36. 
 102. See Wilkinson v. Austin, 125 S. Ct. 2384 (2005); see also Dawson v. Delaware, 503 
U.S. 159, 164 (1992) (finding the introduction of a capital defendant’s gang membership at 
sentencing violated his constitutional rights); Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(illustrating the potential injustice of using gang affiliation as a basis for extended 
administrative segregation, while ultimately decided on the basis of exhaustion of 
administrative remedies).  
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of procedural due process that included notice of the factual basis for 
the classification and a fair opportunity for rebuttal.103 
Thus, while it may be constitutional to isolate an inmate based on 
gang membership, it is just as objectionable to impose extended penal 
isolation on gang members under the conditions of sensory 
deprivation discussed earlier as with any other inmate. With gang 
members, the perceived need for separation simply cannot be equated 
with long-term isolation designed to emasculate the person. 
B. A Critique and Change 
For me to critique the current uses of isolation does not actually 
create a concomitant obligation to present a blueprint for change. I 
realize that there are some inmates who are dangerous and disruptive, 
and who may remain so despite the best efforts of staff. On the other 
hand, we should ask what those “best efforts” are in this country.104 Is 
it simply to impose segregation as a discrete punishment, or to 
reclassify a troublesome inmate and order transfer to a maximum or 
supermax prison? Regrettably, for the most part, those are the best 
efforts. 
I certainly need not mediate between the cognitive-behavioral 
approach to treatment so popular in the United States and the 
psychotherapy approach more popular in Great Britain (and 
especially so at the Grendon Prison in the operation of its therapeutic 
community for well over forty years).105 There are, however, a 
number of possible approaches well described by this nation’s 
leading expert, Hans Toch.106 
 
 103. Wilkinson, 125 S. Ct. at 2398. 
 104. See Gary Beven & Fred Cohen, The Disruptive or Violent Residential Treatment Unit 
Inmate: A Multidisciplinary Training Session on the Usage of Segregation for Mentally Ill 
Offenders, CORRECTIONAL MENTAL HEALTH REP., May–June 2005, at 3 (describing a special 
program at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility and a training session for security and 
mental health staff on the law and clinical-security issues). 
 105. David Jones, Introduction to WORKING WITH DANGEROUS PEOPLE: THE 
PSYCHOTHERAPY OF VIOLENCE 5 (David Jones ed., 2004). 
 106. See TOCH & ADAMS, supra note 37, at 395–424 (including the therapeutic community 
approach, pattern-thinking approach, violence prevention approach used in Canada, and self-
management programs). Whatever the approach, the point is to work with the maladaptive 
behavior and work to change it, not simply isolate it. 
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I fully understand that my reform proposal calls for a major 
revision of prison disciplinary codes. Extended isolation of the 
second degree variety for disciplinary purposes simply would no 
longer be available. However, I would raise no objection, for 
example, to what is termed “keeplock” in New York, where an 
inmate is given a limited, twenty-three-hour-a-day confinement to the 
inmate’s own living area while awaiting a disciplinary hearing or a 
ten-day disposition on a finding of guilty.107  
Where a keeplock-like disposition is not feasible because the 
inmate so sentenced disturbs or threatens other inmates or staff, then 
perhaps there should be a relatively small unit designed to house such 
inmates. The critical point to absorb is that with a disturbed or 
disruptive inmate a form of insulation, not isolation, may be required. 
Thus, access to sensory and social stimulation must be provided 
along with such “amenities” as exercise, reading material, telephone 
access, and such restorative programs as are compatible with the 
inmate’s behavior. This type of unit should be used only as a last 
resort, requiring a supportive record and functioning to separate or 
insulate the inmate from others, and not imposing the isolation 
previously described.108 
For the chronic and disruptive violator the approach would have 
to include a restorative and reformative program. For the “acute” 
violator there remains referral for criminal prosecution, loss of good 
time and a variety of privileges, loss of work, and transfer. I also 
understand the difficulty of reducing sanctions in a world where very 
severe sanctions are routinely imposed and expected.109 The problem, 
 
 107. See Lee v. Coughlin, 26 F. Supp. 2d 615, 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (noting that about 90% 
of confinement-type sentences in New York prisons were to keeplock (confinement in one’s 
own cell) or to “cube confinement” (confinement to one’s own area in a dormitory setting)). 
 108. Does this proposal, or concession if you will, sow the seeds of its own destruction in 
that it may easily grow to become like the present day SHUs? That, of course, is possible but 
not probable if there is oversight and the threat of litigation. The critical factor is to keep the 
objective clear: limited use and duration, the function is one of insulation not isolation, and the 
unit should have very few cells. 
 109. Alvin J. Bronstein, one of our most successful prison litigators and reform advocates, 
writes that incarceration itself is a complete failure; that all prisons cause harm, some more than 
others; and that the best, least destructive, prison he ever visited is in Ringe, Denmark. Alvin J. 
Bronstein, Incarceration as a Failed Policy, CORRECTIONS TODAY, Aug. 2003, at 6, 13. It is 
co-ed, all inmates are recidivists, there are productive jobs, and staff work with inmates, not 
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however, is not beyond resolution. Resolution must be found given 
the profound harm caused by extended penal isolation. 
My primary concern here has been the imposition of extended 
terms of penal isolation under conditions that impose extreme 
measures of social and sensory deprivation. Of course when the 
conditions of confinement also involve lack of sanitation, poor 
ventilation, extraordinary levels of noise, risks of physical harm, 
inadequate food, and the like the case against such isolation becomes 
even clearer.110 Indeed, assuming that the conditions of isolated 
confinement are in some fashion onerous but marginally 
constitutionally acceptable, the harsher the conditions, the shorter the 
period of duration legally available for the use of such isolated 
confinement.111 
Thus, I have elected to approach extended penal isolation 
somewhat apart from the type of add-on, inhuman conditions noted 
above. One may envision a hygienic, sterile physical environment, 
with adequate food and water, some opportunity for large muscle 
activity (if only in-cell exercise), acceptable levels of heat and cold, 
and a decent diet, but with the basic conditions of second degree 
isolation previously described.112 
I am far from alone in my concern about isolation. The United 
Nation’s Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners 
calls for the complete prohibition of punishment by placement in a 
dark cell.113 Andrew Coyle, head of Great Britain’s International 
Center for Prison Studies, considers it a basic principle of reform that 
efforts should be made to abolish solitary confinement as a 
punishment or at least to restrict its use.114 Professor Mushlin notes 
 
simply keeping order. Id. On congratulating the prison governor, he was told, “[R]emember, Al, 
all prisons damage people.” Id. 
 110. WILLIAM C. COLLINS, NAT’L INST. OF CORR., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SUPERMAX 
PRISONS AND THE CONSTITUTION: LIABILITY CONCERNS IN THE EXTENDED CONTROL UNIT, 
33–40 (2004), available at http://nicic.org/library/019835. 
 111. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Maynard, 80 F.3d 1433 (10th Cir. 1996). 
 112. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 113. Standard Minimum Rules for Treatment of Prisoners, Rule 31, available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/h_comp34.htm. 
 114. COYLE, supra note 7, at 80. 
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that a number of respectable professional groups, largely to no avail, 
have called for the curtailment of second degree penal isolation.115 
Preparing this paper originally as a presentation before the 
Commission on Safety and Abuse in Prisons, my hope was to plant 
the seeds for reform in a recommendation the Commission might 
decide to take. I also hope to convince the American Bar 
Association’s Committee on the Legal Status of Prisoners Task Force 
in its revision of standards to view mechanical restraints and penal 
isolation as deserving similar treatment. If judges are persuaded by 
my approach, that too, would be welcome. 
Foundations with money to spend in this area should consider 
funding prison systems willing to create a new paradigm by changing 
policy and procedure along the lines suggested here. I would agree 
that virtually all correctional reform has come through judicial 
activism and, of course, I would offer no objection to that occurring. 
However, based on the case law discussed earlier, and the continued 
movement of the federal judiciary toward a non-interventionist 
posture, I suspect we need to look elsewhere for the required 
changes. 
 
 115. MUSHLIN, supra note 86, at 92 n.30. In this footnote, Mushlin directs the reader to:  
See National Sheriffs’ Assn, Inmates’ Legal Rights 47 (1987) (noting that “the practice 
of solitary confinement is condemned by many groups with correctional interests”). 
See also National Advisory Comm’n on Criminal Justice Standards & Goals, Correc-
tions Standard 2.4 (1973) (isolation should be punishment of last resort and then 
should not extend beyond 10 days); American Correctional Assn, Standards for Adult 
Correctional Institutions Standard 3-4243 (1990) (outside limit should be set on 
duration of disciplinary detention; 30 days sufficient for most cases; all cases in which 
sanction is extended over 60 days requires the provision of the same services and 
privileges as are available to persons in protective custody and administrative 
segregation); Model Sentencing and Corrections Act § 4-502 (1983) (limited 
confinement to solitary confinement to no more than 90 days). But see ABA, 
Standards for Criminal Justice Standard 23-6.13(d) (1986) (refusing to adopt the 
recommendation of the drafting committee that solitary confinement be abolished but 
decreeing that the conditions must not deprive the inmates of “items necessary for the 
maintenance of psychological and physical well-being”).  
Id. The ABA Standards on point are currently under revision and as a member of the revising 
group, I plan to put forward a plan for abolition of the first degree of isolation and a severe 
curtailment of the second degree of isolation. 
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